Table Of ContentList of Tables Acknowledgments List of Acronyms Introduction Part One--Conflicts and Peacebuilding Approaches in the Former Soviet Space Chapter 1 Types and Levels of Conflict in the Former Soviet Space Chapter 2 Responses to Conflict: Between Peacebuilding and Multilateralism à la Russe Part Two--Inside Russia Chapter 3 Who Speaks, Decides, and Implements? Russia's Actors in Foreign and Security Policy Chapter 4 The Discursive Antagonism of "Russia" and "the West" Chapter 5 Russia and Its "Near Abroad": Public Debates and Legal Battles Chapter 6 The Evolution of Russian Discourses and Outcomes on the "Near Abroad," 1991-2008 Part Three--The Russian Role in Georgia, 1991-2008 Chapter 7 Georgia and Russia: A Historical Love-Hate Relationship Chapter 8 South Ossetia: Local Conflict, Global Interests Chapter 9 The Conflict in Abkhazia and Russia's Contradictory Involvement Chapter 10 External Actors' Involvement in Georgia's Territorial Identity Conflicts Chapter 11 Hardening of Russian-Georgian Relations After 2000 Chapter 12 Russia's Search for a Role in Georgia: Between Multilateralism and Unilateralism, 1991-2008 Conclusion: The Russian Role in Georgia - Exemplary or a Casus Sui Generis ? Bibliography Index About the Author
SynopsisRussian Foreign Policy Debates and the Conflicts in Georgia (1991-2008): Between Multilateralism and Unilateralism discusses the conflicts and crises in the former Soviet space from a historical perspective and reconstructs the often-contradictory approaches of public actors in Russia on how to deal with them. Notably, it enquires whether the ......, Russian Foreign Policy Debates and the Conflicts in Georgia (1991-2008): Between Multilateralism and Unilateralism discusses the conflicts and crises in the former Soviet space from a historical perspective and reconstructs the often-contradictory approaches of public actors in Russia on how to deal with them. Notably, it enquires whether the actions suggested follow a "multilateral" approach, thus one based on pluralist decisions and international law, or, on the opposite, a "unilateral" one, concentrating exclusively on Russia's own national interests, to the detriment of commonly agreed international rules. The case of Georgia, from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the "Five-Day War" in August 2008, serves as an example illustrating the Russian approaches to conflict management. Richly illustrated with empirical data, the three parts of this book show how foreign and security policy debates in Moscow and their outcomes on the ground evolved from a chaotic policy of ad hoc interventions in the 1990s to a coherent, geopolitically informed strategy of coercion and persuasion in the 2000s. About a decade and a half before the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow had already shown its willingness to go quite far in defending its interests in its traditional sphere of influence in the former Soviet space., Russian Foreign Policy Debates and the Conflicts in Georgia (1991-2008): Between Multilateralism and Unilateralism discusses the conflicts and crises in the former Soviet space from a historical perspective and reconstructs the often-contradictory approaches of public actors in Russia on how to deal with them. Notably, it inquires whether the actions suggested follow a "multilateral" approach--one based on pluralist decisions and international law--or, on the opposite, a "unilateral" one--concentrating exclusively on Russia's own national interests, to the detriment of commonly agreed-on international rules. The case of Georgia, from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the "Five-Day War" in August 2008, serves as an example illustrating Russian approaches to conflict management. Richly illustrated with empirical data, the three parts of this book show how foreign and security policy debates in Moscow and their outcomes on the ground evolved from a chaotic policy of ad hoc interventions in the 1990s to a coherent, geopolitically informed strategy of coercion and persuasion in the 2000s. About a decade and a half before the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow had already shown its willingness to go quite far in defending its interests in the former Soviet space.