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In Defense of a Political Court by Terri Jennings Peretti (1999, Hardcover)
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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherPrinceton University Press
ISBN-100691009058
ISBN-139780691009056
eBay Product ID (ePID)700559
Product Key Features
Number of Pages384 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NameIn Defense of a Political Court
Publication Year1999
SubjectConstitutional, Judicial Power
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaLaw
AuthorTerri Jennings Peretti
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height1 in
Item Weight24.1 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceCollege Audience
LCCN99-012206
ReviewsA lively and original work. . . . I found the book thought provoking, and . . . I recommend it highly. ---Thomas M. Keck, The Law and Politics Book Review, "A lively and original work. . . . I found the book thought provoking, and . . . I recommend it highly." ---Thomas M. Keck, The Law and Politics Book Review, "A lively and original work. . . . I found the book thought provoking, and . . . I recommend it highly." --Thomas M. Keck, The Law and Politics Book Review, "A lively and original work. . . . I found the book thought provoking, and . . . I recommend it highly."-- Thomas M. Keck, The Law and Politics Book Review
Dewey Edition21
Dewey Decimal342.7/3
SynopsisCan the Supreme Court be free of politics? Do we want it to be? Normative constitutional theory has long concerned itself with the legitimate scope and limits of judicial review. Too often, theorists seek to resolve that issue by eliminating politics from constitutional decisionmaking. In contrast, Terri Peretti argues for an openly political role for the Supreme Court. Peretti asserts that politically motivated constitutional decisionmaking is not only inevitable, it is legitimate and desirable as well. When Supreme Court justices decide in accordance with their ideological values, or consider the likely political reaction to the Court's decisions, a number of benefits result. The Court's performance of political representation and consensus-building functions is enhanced, and the effectiveness of political checks on the Court is increased. Thus, political motive in constitutional decision making does not lead to judicial tyranny, as many claim, but goes far to prevent it. Using pluralist theory, Peretti further argues that a political Court possesses instrumental value in American democracy. As one of many diverse and redundant political institutions, the Court enhances both system stability and the quality of policymaking, particularly regarding the breadth of interests represented.
LC Classification NumberKF4575.P466 1999
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