Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science Ser.: What Was Mechanical about Mechanics : The Concept of Force Between Metaphysics and Mechanics from Newton to Lagrange by J. C. Boudri (2002, Hardcover)
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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherSpringer Netherlands
ISBN-101402002335
ISBN-139781402002335
eBay Product ID (ePID)2205619
Product Key Features
Number of PagesXvi, 280 Pages
Publication NameWhat Was Mechanical about Mechanics : The Concept of Force Between Metaphysics and Mechanics from Newton to Lagrange
LanguageEnglish
Publication Year2002
SubjectPhilosophy & Social Aspects, Energy, Mechanics / General, Physics / General
TypeTextbook
AuthorJ. C. Boudri
Subject AreaScience
SeriesBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science Ser.
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Weight46.6 Oz
Item Length9.3 in
Item Width6.1 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN2001-050645
Dewey Edition22
Series Volume Number224
Number of Volumes1 vol.
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal531.6
Table Of Content1: Introduction.- A. The Unity of the Concept of Force.- 2: Force Like Water.- 3: Leibniz: Force as the Essence of Substance.- B. Towards a New Metaphysics.- 4: From Cause to Phenomenon.- 5: From Efficient to Final Causes: The Origin of the Principle of Least Action.- C. Between Metaphysics and Mechanics.- 6: The Concept of Force in the 1779 Berlin Essay Competition.- 7: Lagrange's Concept of Force.- 8: Metaphysics Concealed.
SynopsisThe Age of Reason is left the Dark Ages of the history of mechanics. Clifford A. Truesdell) 1. 1 THE INVISIBLE TRUTH OF CLASSICAL PHYSICS There are some questions that physics since the days of Newton simply cannot an- swer. Perhaps the most important of these can be categorized as 'questions of eth- ics', and 'questions of ultimate meaning'. The question of humanity's place in the cosmos and in nature is pre-eminently a philosophical and religious one, and physics seems to have little to contribute to answering it. Although physics claims to have made very fundamental discoveries about the cosmos and nature, its concern is with the coherence and order of material phenomena rather than with questions of mean- ing. Now and then thinkers such as Stephen Hawking or Fritjof Capra emerge, who appear to claim that a total world-view can be derived from physics. Generally, however, such authors do not actually make any great effort to make good on their claim to completeness: their answers to questions of meaning often pale in compari- 2 son with their answers to conventional questions in physics. Moreover, to the extent that they do attempt to answer questions of meaning, it is easy to show that they 3 draw on assumptions from outside physics., The Age of Reason is left the Dark Ages of the history of mechanics. Clifford A. Truesdell) 1. 1 THE INVISIBLE TRUTH OF CLASSICAL PHYSICS There are some questions that physics since the days of Newton simply cannot an swer. Perhaps the most important of these can be categorized as 'questions of eth ics', and 'questions of ultimate meaning'. The question of humanity's place in the cosmos and in nature is pre-eminently a philosophical and religious one, and physics seems to have little to contribute to answering it. Although physics claims to have made very fundamental discoveries about the cosmos and nature, its concern is with the coherence and order of material phenomena rather than with questions of mean ing. Now and then thinkers such as Stephen Hawking or Fritjof Capra emerge, who appear to claim that a total world-view can be derived from physics. Generally, however, such authors do not actually make any great effort to make good on their claim to completeness: their answers to questions of meaning often pale in compari 2 son with their answers to conventional questions in physics. Moreover, to the extent that they do attempt to answer questions of meaning, it is easy to show that they 3 draw on assumptions from outside physics.